Miranda\u27s Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World by Klein, Susan R.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 91
Issue 3 Spring Article 2
Spring 2001
Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World
Susan R. Klein
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Susan R. Klein, Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 567 (2000-2001)
0091-4169/01/9103-0567
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL AW & CRIMINOLOGY VcI 91. Nz 3
Copyright 0 2001 by NorwhesU Unersity. Sdhool of Law L USA
RBR ANDA'S EXCEPTIONS IN A POST-
DICKERSON WORLD
SUSAN R. KLEIN*
Can the holding in Miranda v. Arizona,' as well as the nu-
merous exceptions to its dictates, be adequately justified after
the United States Supreme Court's latest pronouncement in
Dickerson v. United States?2 ChiefJustice Warren in Miranda held
that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpa-
tory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of a procedural
safeguard effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination."3 While this holding appeared to enshrine the
four warnings4 into the Fifth Amendment itself, this interpreta-
tion was short-lived. Chief Justice Burger, in crafting an im-
peachment exception in Harris v. New York,5 began a series of
exceptions based upon the premise that a violation of Miranda
does not necessarily violate the Constitution." Conservative le-
* Baker & Botts Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. I thank Michael
Churgin, Yale Kamisar, Douglas Laycock, George C. Thomas III, and Patrick Woolley
for their comments. I appreciate the research assistance of Katrina Blodgett.
' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
3 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
4 The procedural safeguards mandated by the Court require officers to deliver four
warnings to a suspect suffering custodial interrogation and to obtain a waiver of these
rights before taking a statement. A suspect must be informed that he has a right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in court, that he has the
right to consult with an attorney and to have that attorney present during interrogation,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed. Id. at 467-73. As an icon
of criminal procedure put it, "I venture to say that at the time the Miranda opinion was
handed down almost everyone who read it (including the dissenting Justices)
understood that it was a constitutional decision-an interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Yale Kamisar, Fonard: From Miranda
to §3501 to Dickerson to ... 99 MICH. L REv. 879, 883 (2001) (emphasis in original).
s 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (creating impeachment exception to exclusion of statements
obtained via custodial interrogation without warnings).
£ See, e-g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (noting that Miranda "serves
the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It
567
SUSAN]. KLEIN
gal scholars responded to the deconstitutionalization of
Miranda by suggesting that the Court had no authority, pursuant
to Article III of the federal Constitution, to reverse state crimi-
nal convictions absent an actual constitutional violation! A
rogue Assistant United States Attorney and conservative law pro-
fessor convinced the Fourth Circuit that a largely ignored stat-
ute Congress enacted in 1968 to overrule Miranda had done just
that.8 Finally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in the terribly disappoint-
ing Dickerson case reversing the Fourth Circuit, opined that
Miranda has "constitutional underpinning"9 yet still permits ex-
clusion of "statements which may be by no means involuntary"
under Fifth Amendment and due process standards,' without
attempting to explain this seeming contradiction or to assess the
status of Miranda's exceptions. We are left with the same ques-
tions burning before Dickerson. If Miranda is required by the
Fifth Amendment, how can we admit unwarned statements into
evidence in a criminal trial even for impeachment? Conversely,
if Miranda is not required by the Fifth Amendment, how can we
reverse state court convictions for its violation?
Professor George Thomas and I, in a recent symposium is-
sue of the Michigan Law Review, reach the same general con-
may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."). This list of
exceptions includes Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (fruits exception where second statement
obtained as a result of umwarned statement); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)
(public safety exception); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (impeachment
exception after request for attorney); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (fruits
exception where live witness found as a result of unwarned statement).
7 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUsICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REPORT No. 1, REPORT TO THE ArORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL
INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 437, 543 (1989) (asserting
that Miranda "constituted a usurpation of legislative and administrative powers"); see also
Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 174 (1988); Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial
Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. C-u. L RE v. 938 (1987)
(defending the finding of the Department of Justice report); Joseph D. Grano,
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L.
REv. 100 (1985); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional
Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1978) (suggesting that prophylactic rules are
"neither constitutional nor common law but pragmatism without either precedent or
principle-judicial realism radicalized and rampant").
' United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (Miranda was not a
constitutional holding, and therefore 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (West 1985) successfully
reversed it). "The Department ofJustice, elevating politics over law, prohibited the U.S.
Attorney's Office from arguing that Dickerson's confession is admissible under the
mandate of§ 3501." Id. at 672.
' Dickerson, 120 U.S. at 2234.
'0 Id. at 2336.
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clusions regarding both the justification of Miranda (it can be
satisfactorily explained), and the fate of the pre-Dickerson excep-
tions to Miranda (they healthily survive). However, we reach
these conclusions by radically different routes: Professor Tho-
mas utilizes the malleable Due Process Clause," while I rely
upon the flexibility of constitutional prophylactic rules.'2 While
this difference may not seem striking when focusing solely upon
the Miranda warnings, it is stark when attempting to justify the
Warren Court revolution as a whole, and to account for many
subsequent criminal procedure holdings. Pivotal decisions out-
lining procedures required to uphold Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees can be properly and accu-
rately characterized only as prophylactic rules rather than "true"
constitutional edicts.'3 Reversing every one of these decisions or
shoehorning every one of these rights into the Due Process
Clause would be disastrous.
In this brief commentary, I will respond to Professor Tho-
mas' thoughtful and creative but, in my opinion, ultimately un-
persuasive attempt to relocate the Miranda warnings from the
" See George C. Thomas IlI, Separated At Birth But Siblings Nonethelss: Miranda And
The Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MlIcH. L REv. 1081 (2001).
" See Susan R Klein, Identing and (Re)Formulating Propliyladic Ruls , Safe Harbors,
and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L Rm" 1030, 1032-33
(2001) (developing a conceptual fiamework for constitutional prophylactic rules which
justifies not only Miranda but a host of other Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court
criminal procedure decisions. A prophylactic rule is a doctrinal rule for deciding
whether an explicit constitutional rule is applicable, triggered upon less than a showing
that the explicit rule was violated but providing a similar remedy, and appropriate only
where providing relief upon a showing of an explicit violation is ineffective and the rule
is effective while involving acceptable costs); see also Susan R. Klein, Miranda
Deconstitutionalihe Wien the Sel-Incrimination Clause and the Ciil Rights Act Col4ide 143 U.
PA. L REv. 417, 482-83 (1994) (suggesting that it is the Court's obligation under the
Constitution to create remedies or procedures necessary to safeguard a particular
constitutional provision otherwise at risk. While these remedies and procedures may be
"temporary and/or conditional" this 'constitutional common law has the same status
as 'true' constitutional interpretation" for purposes of civil rights actions).
's Klein, supra note 12, at 1037-44 (providing numerous examples of prophylactic
rules such as the procedure to protect an indigent defendant's right to appellate
counsel in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); the rule establishing a prima facie case
of an equal protection violation without evidence of purposeful discrimination in
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); the presumption against multiple punishments
for the same offense in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); the rule against
reapproaching a suspect in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); the presumption
of incompetent counsel where there is a conflict of interest in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 350 (1980); the presumption of judicial vindictiveness in North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)); and the exclusion of in-court identification of post-
indictment counselless lineup in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)).
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Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause to the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. As a descriptive matter, the
Miranda warnings were designed to prevent compelled state-
ments in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause, not to pro-
tect due process values such as ensuring a fundamentally fair
criminal trial, providing notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the deprivation of a property or liberty interest, and pre-
venting conscience shocking behavior by state actors. As a
normative matter, principles of federalism and separation of
powers militate strongly against an open-ended substantive or
procedural due process monster. In Part I, I explain why, con-
trary to Professor Thomas' thesis, Miranda and its progeny do
not fit comfortably (or at all, for that matter) in the Supreme
Court's substantive due process, procedural due process, or ad-
ministrative due process jurisprudence. Part II then clarifies
why Professor Thomas' attempt to place Miranda in the Due
Process Clause does not save its many exceptions.
None of my criticisms, however, detract from the key insight
provided by Professor Thomas in his article-Miranda has been
effectively transformed over the years from a case that all but
mandated defense attorney participation in custodial interroga-
tions to dispel inherent compulsion, to a case about providing
the minimal amount of notice to a defendant about his privilege
against self-incrimination such that a court can uphold his con-
fession as voluntary. The decision, however, remains one con-
cerned primarily with compulsion, and is concerned with notice
only to the extent that notice dispels compulsion. Moreover,
the answer to this unfortunate transformation is not to leave
Miranda untouched and simply move it from the Self-
Incrimination Clause to the Due Process Clause. The answer,
instead, is to insist that the Supreme Court define what consti-
tutes a "voluntary" confession, consider whether the Miranda
warnings in fact make statements taken during custodial inter-
rogation more or less "voluntary" than alternative procedures,
and design rules to ensure that the Self-Incrimination Clause is
protected in a manner the Court can enforce.
I. MIRANDA WAS DESIGNED TO DISPEL COMPULSION
Professor Thomas argues that Miranda is a case protecting
three potential due process liberty interests: 1) the "liberty in-
[Vol. 91
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terest in not being subjected to custodial interrogation;""4 2) the
liberty interest in making an "an informed choice whether to
answer police questions;"' s and 3) the "liberty interest not to
disclose what we wish to keep secret."'6' Thus, Miranda is about
providing notice, not about prohibiting compulsion, and as
such it reflects due process rather than self-incrimination values.
Professor Thomas claims this interpretation provides a better
description of Miranda and its progeny because it explains why
waivers of Miranda are so easily found, 7 why non-Mirandized
but clearly voluntary statements are nonetheless excluded, 8 and
why sometimes the Miranda presumption of compulsion is ap-
plied and sometimes it isn't.'9
Neither of Professor Thomas' suggestions, to relocate the
Miranda warnings in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment, or, less radically, to retain its status as a
protector of the Self-Incrimination Clause but utilize due ?roc-
ess values to determine when to apply the prophylaxis," are
helpful. I disagree with Professor Thomas on three levels. First,
I disagree with the need for shifting the Miranda warnings from
the Fifth Amendment to the Due Process Clause in order to ex-
plain post-Miranda exceptions and Miranda's waiver doctrine.
We are not limited to the three choices identified by Professor
Thomas: 1) acceptingJustice Scalia's reasoning that Miranda has
been deconstitutionalized by later cases and therefore can be
ignored entirely by the states; 2) reconstitutionalizing Miranda
and overruling its exceptions; or 3) finding another constitu-
tional home for Miranda.2' As I have argued elsewhere, the
'4Thomas, supm note 11, at 1091.
" Id at 1114.
16 Id at1115.
'7 See id& at 1098-1101.
" See id. at 1082, 1091-92.
'9 Seeid. at 1085, 1109-11.
2Seeid. at 1112.
21 See i. at 1088, 1111-12. In response to my criticism, Professor Thomas has
conceded a fourth option: that Miranda might be what he now calls a "weak force"
constitutional rule, but dismisses this as failing to provide "a theory about why the Fifth
Amendment privilege deserves a constitutional prophylaxis." I&L at 1091. I have
provided just such a theory. See Klein, supra note 12, at 1032-33 (noting that where the
Court is "unable to precisely track the constitutional criminal procedural guarantee
before it," it often creates prophylactic rules "that assist it in identifying and
adjudicating constitutional violations," and providing theoretical and practical
justifications for such practice, such as the difficulty of fact-finding in certain situations,
the need to guide law enforcement officials making snap judgments without legal
2001]
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Court could have retained the Miranda doctrine and its excep-
tions by properly labeling it a constitutional prophylactic rule,
defining what that is, and detailing why a prophylactic rule was
necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.2
My approach reaps the same advantage of flexibility of deciding
when to apply the rule, what exceptions to create, and what
form of waiver to require that Professor Thomas claims for his
theory. Instead of a general and vague balancing of "fairness to
the suspect on one side and the interest of the state in accurate
fact-finding on the other,"23 the flexibility of a prophylactic rule
consists of applying it only where the rule is necessary to fulfill
its function. We should judge whether the prophylactic rule is
effective in dispelling the compulsion inherent in custodial in-
terrogation and in assisting the Court in adjudicating claims of a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. We should
consider the costs of lost confessions only to the extent that the
prophylactic rule over-protects the privilege or fails to assist law
enforcement and the courts in obeying and adjudicating the
privilege. 4 Moreover, a significant advantage to my approach is
that it allows Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal
law enforcement departments to share in fashioning any pro-
phylactic rules necessary to protect the privilege, though the fi-
nal decision still rests with the Court.25
My second level of disagreement with Professor Thomas' so-
lution is that the Miranda decision does not fit comfortably, as
either a normative or descriptive proposition, in the Due Proc-
ess Clause. My final criticism is that moving Miranda to the Due
Process Clause would not make post-Miranda cases coherent. I
will start with the former claim. Before we can discuss whether
Miranda can be redescribed as a due process case we must iso-
training, the reality that the Court has limited time to hear individual cases, and the
high stakes of underprotecting constitutional rights where liberty is at stake).
2See Klein, supra note 12, at 1071-77 (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist failed
miserably on all counts in Dickerson).
Thomas, supra note 11, at 1117.
2' See Klein, supra note 12, at 1032-37, Appendix A at 1079 (suggesting that unlike
explicit constitutional interpretation, subconstitutional doctrines such as prophylactic
rules, to the extent they overprotect the constitutional right at issue, can be created,
excepted and modified to account for costs such as lost convictions).
See id at 1052-68 (arguing that prophylactic rules encourage dialogue and
cooperation between the federal judiciary and state and federal executive and legislative
officers, fosters experimentation with new procedures that may work better, and




late what kind of due process Professor Thomas has in mind.
The Court generally divides Fourteenth Amendment due proc-
ess into three component parts.' First, it selectively incorpo-
rates specific provisions defined in the Bill of Rights. Second,
the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that
prevents the government from engaging in conduct that
"shocks the conscience,"' 8 or enacting legislation which inter-
feres with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"29
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used. Third, the
Due Process Clause guarantees that government action depriv-
ing a person of life, liberty or property be implemented in a fair
manner. The third component, procedural due process, can
further be subdivided into procedural due process as applied to
criminal actions,3' and procedural due process as applied to civil
and administrative actions. 2
Though Professor Thomas does not tell us into which of
these categories of due process he would place the Miranda
warnings, they fit into none. I do not say this because I believe,
as Professor Thomas suggests, that the existence of criminal
procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights "sucked most of the
'criminal process' oxygen from the Due Process Clause.""
Rather, I fully agree that both history and text support the idea
that due process has independent life in both the criminal and
civil contexts apart from the particular provisions in the Bill of
Rights.34 However, I do believe, as does the present Court, that
See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL P,CRI MINAL PROCEDURE §§ 2.2-2.7 (2d ed. 1999) (pro-
viding a lucid description of the three components of due process, the arguments for
and against total and selective incorporation, and the impact of incorporation on the
fundamental fairness doctrine).
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that privilege against self-
incrimination was a fundamental right, thus guarantee "would be enforced against the
State under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards" as against
the federal government).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
" SeeUnited States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); see also Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
" See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
SeeMullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Thomas, supra note 11, at 1093.
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884); see also LAF, A ET AL, supra
note 26, § 2.4(b) (chronicling the voluminous debate over the original meaning of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Jerold H. Israel, Free.-Standing Due Poeess and
Criminal Procedure" The Supreme CourtIs Sarch for Intprlie Guddines, 45 ST. Louis L
REv. 303 (2001) (detailing how the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
2001]
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the Warren Court's incorporation of the Bill of Rights through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and its expansive interpretation of
the criminal procedural guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights, leaves little room for additional procedures save those
necessary to ensuring a fair and accurate trial.
A. MIRANDA AS SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS"'
The line between substantive and procedural due process is
not clearly drawn. The Court has identified certain legislative"0
and executive action that simply cannot be countenanced re-
gardless of the procedures used. I would add that the law or
executive action must not infringe on interests related to the
fairness of the trial (though a substantive due process claim may
also result in a claim as to the procedures involved at trial). In
other words, the individual's substantive rights are violated in-
dependent of his right to fair adjudication in a criminal trial,
and the violation of these substantive rights results in an imme-
diate constitutional violation that demands a remedy (though it
may also require the exclusion of evidence in a subsequent
criminal adjudication). We may fit Professor Thomas' under-
standing of Miranda into the substantive due process compo-
nent of the Fourteenth Amendment using this definition.
Under Professor Thomas' theory, a suspect has a substantive
right to be free of custodial interrogation without Miranda-style
notice that he need not answer questions, and/or in maintain-
parallels that of the Fifth Amendment). Regardless of the intent of the framer's of the
Bill of Rights and drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has
utilized the fundamental fairness doctrine since reconstruction, and is unlikely to stop
now.
" The first component of the Due Process Clause, the incorporation doctrine, is
clearly inapplicable.
6The use of substantive due process to restrict the content of substantive criminal
law is not relevant to Thomas' proposal In the interest of full disclosure, since I am
criticizing Professor Thomas' attempt to use due process as overly subjective, I must
admit that NancyJ. King and I have recently devised a sixth factor substantive due proc-
ess test for determining when the government can partially circumvent constitutional
criminal procedural guarantees by labeling a fact an affirmative defense or a sentencing
factor instead of an element. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54
VAND. L. REv. 1467, 1535-42 (2001). I note that in this situation, as in the situation
where the legislature attempts to completely circumvent criminal procedural guaran-
tees by labeling an action "civil," substantive due process is absolutely essential to our
constitutional architecture. Thomas' utilization of the Due Process Clause is absolutely




ing his innermost thoughts. 7 Such interests are clearly not tied
to the truthseeking function of adjudication, though they may
result in a claim as to the procedure involved in his criminal
trial. For example, the suspect may seek to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of his substantive right. Rather than im-
plementing a set of procedures to adjudicate this newly created
liberty interest in receiving Miranda-style warnings, Professor
Thomas appears to claim that while countervailing law en-
forcement interests may be adequate, no set of procedures will
ever be enough to deprive a person of his interest in notice.
This same definition would include the substantive due
process right to be free from stomach pumping recognized by
the Court in Rochin v. Cal fornia,s the right not to be forcibly
medicated in the absence of a showing that the medication was
medically appropriate recognized by the Court by Riggins v. Ne-
vada,9 and potentially the right of an actually innocent person
not to be executed by the state, mentioned by the Court in Her-
rera v. Collins.40 Though the Court did not, I would include in
this list the whippings barred by Brown v. Mississippi,4' which
seems to me an immediate and actionable wrong regardless of
whether evidence obtained by the torture is offered at a crimi-
nal trial.
42
'7Thomas, supra note 11, at 1114-15.
"' 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that the violation of bodily integrity inherent in en-
forced stomach pumping shocks the conscience of the Court).
'9 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
' 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
4' 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (criminal conviction based upon confession obtained by
a white state official severely whipping an African-American defendant offended the
fundamental traditions and conscience of society, and therefore "the use of the
confession . . . obtained [through physical torture] as the basis for conviction and
sentence was a clear denial of due process.").
As a procedural due process case, it probably could not sustain a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All the procedure due persons in such cases is the exclusion of
any evidence obtained by these deprivations in a criminal trial, and the availability of a
state tort or criminal law remedy. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). overruled on
other grounds by Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977). Likewise the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause is not
violated unless evidence is admitted in the criminal trial. See United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that a Fourth Amendment violation is
complete upon the search or seizure, whereas a violation of the Self-Incrimination
Clause cannot occur until trial); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)
(government can compel a statement so long as it does not use the results in a criminal
proceeding). In today's post-incorporation world, however, the police misconduct in
Brown would be actionable as a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that excessive force in making
SUSANR. KLEIN [Vol. 91
The attempt to find a substantive due process home for a
Miranda violation will fail for three reasons. First, there is no
liberty interest as described by Professor Thomas that history,
tradition, current American consensus, or state law establishes
as being worthy of due process protections. The Court has been
understandably reluctant to extend substantive due process be-
yond "matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the
right to bodily integrity. 43 Since the Miranda warnings protect
none of these interests, that alone should end the matter. The
Court has also made clear that it will not recognize any substan-
tive due process liberty interests occasioned by an arrest beyond
the protections already provided by the Fourth Amendment."
That, again, should end the matter. However, even assuming
the Court would be willing to add additional liberty protections,
precisely what Professor Thomas offers as his new liberty inter-
est is not entirely clear. On one reading of his theory, it is an in-
terest in obtaining the warnings themselves, 5 on another it is a
liberty interest in being free from custodial interrogation," and
a third possibility is the interest in not revealing one's "inner-
most thoughts., 4V None is a proper liberty interest protected by
the substantive due process components of the Fifth or Four-
arrest should be analyzed only under Fourth Amendment).
'3 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833 (1998) (Kennedy, J, concurring) (loss of life implicated a protected liberty in-
terest).
" See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 274 (holding that the matter of pre-trial deprivation of
liberty addressed by the Fourth Amendment); see also Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 679-80
(holding that the deprivation of liberty occasioned by an arrest does not trigger the
strict judicial scrutiny of substantive due process because the system provides adequate
procedural control such as warrants and judicial determinations of probable cause);
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833 (holding that substantive due process analysis appropriate for
high speed police chase case because victim was not yet seized, and therefore the
conduct was not covered by the Fourth Amendment).
" Professor Thomas writes that "Miranda is about fair notice that suspects have no
duty to answer police questions." Thomas, supra note 11 at 1102. He also claims that
there is a "due process right to notice that suspects do not have to answer police
questions ..... Id. at 1104. Professor Thomas comments that "a... due process liberty
interest is the suspect's option to make an informed choice whether to answer police
questions and risk providing the state with evidence against him that increases the risk
of conviction." Id. at 1114.
16 Professor Thomas contends that "a permissible understanding of Miranda is that it
protects the liberty interest in not being subjected to custodial interrogation.. ." Id. at
1091. He argues that "The denial of autonomy and human dignity by custodial
interrogation might constitute a deprivation of a due process liberty interest." Id. at
1112.
See id., at 1115.
MIRANDA WARNINGS
teenth Amendments. I will start with a liberty interest in notice
that one need not answer police questions, regardless of
whether any subsequent cooperation or revelation was voluntary
or compelled.
A requirement of notice outside the trial setting regarding
constitutional criminal procedural guarantees has been rou-
tinely rejected by the Court. In addition to the lack of any con-
stitutional or historical basis for a notice requirement, this
practice reflects, in part, the lack of a principled basis for de-
termining when and how much notice is required. For exam-
ple, how is the Court to decide which specific constitutional
criminal protections trigger an independent Due Process Clause
right to be notified that one's conduct might impair the future
utilization of this right? Why not require police to notify an in-
dividual that he need not consent to a search in order to protect
his Fourth Amendment right to a judicial warrant based upon
probable cause?49 Should the government give notice to a sus-
pect that one of his "friends" is actually an undercover operative
working for the police, in order to protect his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel?0 Should a suspect be informed that the
invocation of his right to remain silent allows reapproach by an
officer to interrogate on a different offense, whereas his invoca-
tion of his right to an attorney does not?1 Must the defendant
'a I will not discuss the third proposed liberty interest. An extensive and complex
body of jurisprudence under the First Amendments free speech and Fifth
Amendmen's Self-Incrimination Clause already protects freedom of thought.
Throwing free standing or substantive due process into the mix adds nothing but
confusion.
49 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that knowledge of
right to refuse consent to search simply one factor in determining whether consent vol-
untarily given, for purposes of determining whether the warrant or probable cause
clauses are triggered).
Compare Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that incriminating
information elicited from indicted defendant via confidential informant violated
defendant's Sixth Amendment right as to the theft charge to which the Sixth
Amendment right had attached, it did not require exclusion of evidence pertaining to
potential additional charges to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not
attached), with Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S 292 (1990) (holding that where Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has not attached the Sixth Amendment does not require
that undercover officer blow his cover by Mirandizing a suspect before eliciting
information from him).
" Compare Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (holding that after a defendant
asserts his Miranda rights, he can be questioned at a later time regarding a different
crime after receiving a new set of warnings), with Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675
(1988) (holding that once defendant invokes his Miranda right to an attorney, he
cannot be questioned even about a different crime).
2001]
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be informed that the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel on a specific charge will not bar questioning on a dif-
ferent charge unless the defendant invokes his Miranda right to
an attorney?52 Must an individual detained pursuant to a valid
traffic stop be informed that the traffic stop is over and that he
is free to go before the officer may engage in further question-
ing?53 Must an individual be informed that there is a method
for recovery of property seized pursuant to a valid search war-
rant?54 Must an individual be informed that he can refuse to an-
swer non-custodial questions by federal law enforcement agents
in order to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in a future criminal trial against him involving the
answers to those questions?55 Must an individual be Mirandized
by a government agent requesting an oral or written factual dec-
laration in order to protect his privilege against self-
incrimination?56 The Court has answered each of these ques-
tions in the negative. It is incumbent upon the individual to be
aware of and assert his rights.
" See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) (holding that the attachment of Sixth
Amendment right to counsel for robbery charge did not bar custodial interrogation
after Miranda waiver on unrelated burglary).
" See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (rejecting per se rule that the traffic stop
becomes an illegal detention unless the officer informs the detainee that he is free to go
before requesting consent to search his car).
" See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (holding that when police
seize property pursuant to a search warrant for a criminal investigation, due process
does not require that they provide the owner with notice of state law remedies which
are established by published, generally available state statutes in caselaw); see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 41 (d) (providing that federal agents give subject of search a copy of the warrant,
but making no provision for notifying the subject about the procedures for seeking
return of property).
" See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (holding that defendant's denial
of a bribery allegation to federal agents questioning him violates 18 U.S.C. § 1001
proscription against false statements, "exculpatory no" doctrine is not required by the
privilege against self-incrimination despite suspect's fear that his silence will be used
against him later or his lack of knowledge that silence was an available option).
56 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (affirming guilty plea to
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316, where defendant lied to customs inspector when asked,
without Miranda warnings, whether he had currency in excess of $10,000 to declare, but
upholding Ninth Circuit determination that criminal forfeiture of entire $357,144
constituted an excessive fine); see also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)
(holding that defendant can assert Fifth Amendment privilege to preclude criminal
punishment for refusing to comply with occupational tax statute where payment




Professor Thomas cannot explain why there is no liberty in-
terest in notice of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment criminal
procedural protections outside of the trial setting, but there is a
liberty interest in notice that one need not answer questions
when in police custody. He does attempt to justify giving a due
process notice right to Miranda warnings yet offering no due
process notice of a Fourth Amendment right to refuse to give
consent to a search, stating that the difference is in:
... the level of pressure between typical cases of police ap-
proaching an inaividual on the street and asking a question,
and police conducting a sustained interrogation of a suspect
who is under arrest. Under arrest, in an unfamiliar room,
suspects face police interrogators who are capable of relent-
less questionifig and who imply, if they do not state, that the
suspect must answer. This is about as extreme a pressure to
answer as interro tion can get short of physical threats or
physical coercion.
This justification is an admission that Professor Thomas is not
concerned with a suspect obtaining information or notice that
he is free to refuse to answer questions, but rather is concerned
that the suspect be free from compulsion. Notice is necessary
here only to dispel compulsion. This brings us right back to the
privilege against self-incrimination.5
Moreover, once we accept a new liberty interest in notice
regarding the privilege against the Self-Incrimination Clause's
freedom from answering questions that might incriminate one
in a criminal trial, why stop at the four Miranda warnings in de-
scribing this liberty interest? If Professor Thomas is truly wor-
ried about "the unfairness which comes with making a choice
based on incomplete or false information, '"' 9 why not require of-
ficers to give notice to arrestees that they will lie to them during
the custodial interrogation? How about telling the suspect that
his attorney, were he to ask for one, would certainly insist that
he remain silent? How about notice to the suspect that if he re-
-' Thomas, supra note 11, at 1102-03.
' Unlike the lack of Miranda-style warnings outside the trial setting found in the
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, and Brogan, 522 U.S. 398, cases, the Supreme Court has
declined to decide whether a grand jury witness must be varned of her Fifth
Amendment privilege. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 190-91 (1977).
However, whichever way it may eventually rule, it is clearly a Fifth Amendment Privilege
against self-incrimination issue, not one of due process.
S9 Thomas, supra note 11, at 1105.
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fuses to waive his Miranda rights, his statements may still be used
to impeach him and to obtain leads as to other evidence and
witnesses? There is simply no principled stopping point for de-
termining how much notice is required.
Next, let us suppose this liberty interest is the freedom from
the custodial interrogation itself. If by this Professor Thomas
means the right to be free from custodial interrogations that
compel a statement from a suspect, he is correct but his theory
is unnecessary. Forcing a suspect to talk by prolonged interro-
gation or other coercive means would, of course, make the
statement involuntarl under the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause. If Professor Thomas means the freedom
of a suspect not be subjected to any police questioning at all, he
is incorrect. Questioning a suspect, even without giving him no-
tice that he need not answer these questions, is insufficiently
shocking to constitute a violation of substantive due process.
Though Professor Thomas and his students apparently disagree,
I suspect many people see nothing "fundamentally unfair" or
"shocking" about the police asking a suspect to explain himself
once there has been sufficient indication he has committed a
crime to justify an arrest. In fact, short of actual compulsion,"1
the Court has acknowledged a "need for police questioning as a
tool for the effective enforcement of criminal law. Without such
investigation, those who are innocent might be falsely accused,
those who are guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many
crimes would go unsolved."62 Thus we force witnesses and sus-
pects into the grandjury,3 and even onto the stand of a criminal
case not their own. Like a suspect suffering custodial interro-
gation, individuals subpoenaed to the grand jury or a criminal
60 SeeMalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
6' Of course if there is actual compulsion in the interrogation the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against coerced confessions will step in.6 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
6 SeeFED. R Civ. P. 17; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that
every person within the jurisdiction of the government is bound to appear before the
grand jury when properly summoned); United States v. Calandra, 413 U.S. 338 (1974)
(holding that the grand jury has authority to call witnesses and citizens are required to
attend); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (trial subpoenas).
6 See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943) (holding that witness in criminal
trial must claim the privilege). Of course this is not true of a criminal defendant, who
has a Fifth Amendment right not to be called in his own trial. See Griffin v. California,




trial have no liberty interest in freedom from the prosecutorial
interrogation. Similarly, the government requires the produc-
don of financial and other information that may be incriminat-
ing in filings such as federal income tax forms" and in reports
submitted at the international border on pain of criminal sanc-
tion. Though, like a suspect suffering custodial interrogation,
they may assert their privilege, they have no liberty interest in
freedom from filling out the forms.
Cases where the Court did find police conduct to be shock-
ing all involved instances of intentional police brutality that di-
rectly resulted in serious physical injury.6 The Court was not
shocked by reckless police behavior that directly caused the
death of innocent persons,O nor was it shocked by intentional
omissions that indirectly resulted in the death of innocent per-
sons." It seems more than an overstatement to describe a world
without Miranda as shocking, or as depriving the defendant of
"that fumdamental fairness essential to the very concept of jus-
tice."'7  Police conduct in questioning a suspect, questioning
him without providing the Miranda warnings, and attempting to
get him to reveal his participation in a crime is simply not com-
parable to the forced emetic administered in Rochin. I find even
that case questionable under the present interpretation of the
substantive Due Process Clause (though happily covered now by
See, eg., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (West 2000) (criminalizing willfully attempting to evade
taxes); 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (West 2000) (criminalizing willfully failing to file return).
65 See, eg., 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1994) (requiring that individuals and entities report to
the U.S. Customs Service when importing or exporting over $10,000 in U.S. currency or
its foreign monetary equivalent); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5233 (1994) (criminalizing the
willful failure to file such report).
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (ruling against plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action founded on Eighth Amendment and procedural due process, leaving open
a substantive due process claim based on corporal punishment of a public school
child); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (holding that police
recklessly engaging in a high speed chase resulting in the death of a citizen %,as not
sufficiently egregious to shock the conscience).
' See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (holding that city's
failure to train or warn its employees about known hazards beneath the city streets,
resulting in death by asphyxia in a manhole, was insufficiently shocking to constitute a
violation of substantive due process); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that substantive due process guarantee against
state deprivation of safety does not apply to social workers who have no affirmative duty
to prevent a parent from maiming his child, even where the worker had knowledge of
the abuse).
'Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
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the Fourth Amendment itself), given Alabama's recent experi-
ment with chain gangs, the general public's reaction to the
caning of a young American vandal in Singapore,2 the Court's
sanctioning the punishment of an innocent spouse in Bennis v.
Michigan,73 and the Court's acceptance of a sixteen-hour painful
detention of a drug mule with balloons of cocaine heroically re-
tained in her alimentary canal until a court-ordered rectal exam
finally caused defecation."74  Scholars and Justices may legiti-
mately argue about whether this cabining of substantive due
process is as it should be; opponents noting that whether the
Constitution has been violated should depend upon more than
the level of squeamishness of five of nine Justices, 7 and advo-
cates supgesting that the Court consider evolving concepts of
fairness. Regardless of one's position on the propriety of sub-
7, See Alan Sverdlik, Chain Gangs: Crime Deterrent or Brutality? Alabama Brings Back
Shackes, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 4, 1995, at D4, available at 1995 WL 6518766
(describing the first day of chain gang labor, and noting the 70% approval rating chain
gangs receive in the state of Alabama). Chain gangs were discontinued four years later
after a series of lawsuits, ostensibly to alleviate a guard shortage. See Alabama, Short of
Guards, Ends Chain Gangs, MILWAtMEEJ. SENTINEL, Oct. 31, 1999, at 9, available at 1999
WL 21546632.
72 Editorials and letters to the editor throughout the country expressed support for
Singapore's corporal punishment of Fay. See, e.g., Jason C. Smith, Editorial: Michael Bay
Got What He Deserved, CHARLEsTON DAiLY MArn, May 18, 1994, at 7A, available at 1994 WL
1289685 1; Michael F. Mazza, Voice of the People (Letter): Michael Fay Got What He Deserved,
Cm. TRm., May 16, 1994, at 10, available at 1994 WL 6534075; Elizabeth Schuett, Op.
Ed.: Junior High Students Unanimously Agree: Michael Fay Deserves His Punishment, DAYTON
DALY NEWS, May 4, 1994, at IhA, available at 1994 WL 4289825.
516 U.S. 442 (1996) (holding that substantive due process is not offended by
permitting the state to confiscate an automobile from an innocent owner because her
husband used it as a site to commit an illicit sexual act with a prostitute).
, See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
7' See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89
(1947) (Black,J., dissenting).
76 See, e.g.,Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952)
(arguing that the fundamental fairness standard does not allow judges to exercise
"merely personal and private notions" ofjustice, but that there are limits "derived from
considerations that are fused in the whole nature of judicial process . . . These are
considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal
profession.") (citation omitted); Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application of
Substantive Due Process: A Tale of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453 (1997) (contrasting
the Court's willingness to apply substantive due process to strike an excessive monetary
sanction against a corporate civil tortfeasor in BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), with
its unwillingness to rigorously apply substantive due process against state legislation
authorizing forfeiture of property belonging to innocent owners if used by criminals in
Bennis, 516 U.S. 442).
MIRANDA WARNINGS
stantive due process and the merits of prior cases, however, a
Miranda violation isn't even close.
A third reason why an attempt to place Miranda in the sub-
stantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment
fails is the Court's wise holding that where a particular constitu-
tional guarantee protects against a particular type of challenged
government action, "that Amendment, not the more general-
ized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for
analyzing [those] claims. '77 This rule makes good sense in a
post-selective incorporation world for exactly the same reason
that the Court shifted in the 1960s from the fundamental fair-
ness standard to the selective incorporation doctrine. That is,
the Court is reluctant to "expand the concept of substantive due
process because the guideposts for responsible decision-making
in this chartered area are scarce and open-ended, '' 8 or, as Jus-
tice Scalia said more colorfully, it turns the Court into a "nine-
headed Caesar."' The argument in favor of both total and se-
lective incorporation8 of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment is that it avoids the subjectivity inherent in the ap-
plication of the fundamental fairness doctrine pre-
incorporation.
This more-specific-provision rule cuts off Professor Thomas'
due process proposal, and should cause the Court to recharac-
terize some older substantive due process cases should that
same misconduct arise in a post-selective-incorporation world.
It cuts off Professor Thomas' claim because the Miranda warn-
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that claims that law en-
forcement officers have used excessive force must be anal)zed under the Fourth
Amendment and not the substantive Due Process Clause); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266 (1994) (refusing to recognize a substantive due process right to be free from
criminal prosecution except upon probable cause, finding instead that the Fourth
Amendment addresses the matter of pre-trial deprivations of liberty).
7 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
"Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see also Bowers v. Hard-ick, 478
U.S. at 195 ('There should be ... great resistance to expand the substantive reach of ..
. [the Due Process Clause], particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental.").
"' See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(contending that the fundamental fairness doctrine permitted the Court to
"substitut[e] its own concepts of decency and fundamental justice for the language of
the Bill of Rights.").
8 Selective incorporation is less subjective than fundamental fairness in two ways: 1)
it points to a textual source of the right; and 2) once the right is incorporated the scope
of the right is dependent upon case law surrounding that constitutional clause, there is
no discretion in deciding which parts of the clause are necessary to ordered liberty.
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ings protect a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself, and as such ought to
be analyzed under the Self-Incrimination Clause. Rochin v. Cali-
fornia8 2 would certainly be treated as a Fourth Amendment case
after Graham v. Connor.3  Cases such as Brown v. Mississippe'
would likely be viewed today as either Fourth or Fifth Amend-
ment rather than substantive due process cases.""
That the Miranda warnings are better placed in the Fifth
Amendment than in substantive due process is evident from
Professor Thomas' own explanation of the value of providing
such notice. He claims that notice is needed 1) because sus-
pects otherwise believe they have a legal duty to answer police
questions; 2) to assist suspects in making an informed choice
whether to answer police questions and risk providing the state
with evidence against them; and 3) because suspects will other-
wise forfeit their liberty interest in choosing whether to reveal
their innermost thoughts. As an empirical matter I believe the
need for Miranda warnings solely to provide "notice" is, at this
point in time, superfluous. After the wave of television cop
shows from Hill Street Blues to NYPD Blue, any American with a
TV set has some awareness of the Miranda warnings. 6 But even
82342 U.S. 165 (1952).
83 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). The Court said as much in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998) (explaining that Rochin "was decided
long before Graham v. Connor. . . and today would be treated under the Fourth
Amendment, albeit with the same result.").
8 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
The value I see in calling coerced confessions a violation of substantive due process
rather than the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause is that this will allow
coerced persons to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim despite the fact that a confession may
never have been given, or, if given, may never have been used in Court, and therefore
the Fifth Amendment was never violated. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir.
1991) (no civil rights action for intentional violation of Miranda where no charges filed,
as Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated until statement admitted into criminal trial),
rev'd en banc, 963 F.2d 1220 (1992) (civil rights plaintiffs substantive due process rights
violated), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992).
8 See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621, 651 (1996) (noting that 93% surveyed in a national poll knew they had a right to
an attorney if arrested, and 80% of the respondents in another poll knew they had a
right to remain silent if arrested). Of course being able to partially recite the warn-
ings may be a far cry from actually understanding and being able to apply the warn-
ings. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. Rv. 1134 (1980) (finding that many adults failed to fully under-
stand all four warnings even after the recitation, and contending that they would have
to explain their criminal involvement in court if questioned by thejudge). However,
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if I'm wrong, and a suspect does lack notice that he can termi-
nate the interview and keep those innermost thoughts all to
himself, why do these particular kinds of erroneous beliefs
bother us any more than the hundreds of other erroneous fac-
tual beliefs held by citizens regarding the criminal justice system
and life in general? It bothers us because we fear that other-
wise, suspects will be compelled to speak against their will. The
act of notice by the interrogating police officer reassures the de-
fendant that the officer is prepared to recognize the defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege, and will not attempt to badger or
beat a statement out of him. 7 Thus, Miranda protects a quintes-
sential Fifth Amendment value.
B. MIRANDA AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
It sometimes appears that Professor Thomas makes a pro-
cedural due process claim as when, for example, he tell us there
is a "free standing due process protection by which state crimi-
nal proceedings can be evaluated."' s He also appears to make
this claim when he analogizes Miranda to other criminal proce-
dural due process cases such as Pennsylvania v. Ritchie and
Chambers v. Mississippi.90 As with substantive due process, we must
first find a liberty or property interest that is being infringed by
the state. I have already explained why I believe Thomas' no-
tion of a liberty interest to information regarding whether one
can cut off questioning, to information whether one needs to
Thomas does not cure these defects. He does not require officers or more neutral
parties to actually explain the warnings; he simply moves their constitutional home.
If Miranda warnings were terminated, however, it may be true that over time,
depending upon reruns, they would fade from popular media and thus from public
awareness as well. Or we might imagine a world without the Miranda decision. In
that case, a suspect is in the same position regarding her fifth-amendment rights as
she is with all others criminal procedure rights-she can learn them herself or ask the
officer for information. Moreover, neither Professor Thomas nor I are proposing to
eliminate the warnings, nor do we suggest it was a mistake to institute them. Our
difference is simply in whether they are more accurately described and more
appropriately placed in the privilege against self-incrimination or free-standing
substantive or procedural due process.
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
8sThomas, supra note 11, at 1096.
480 U.S. 39 (1987) (holding that the state is obliged to provide the defense with
subpoena access to possibly favorable agency records).
410 U.S. 284 (1973) (holding that due process requires right to cross-examine
hostile defense witnesses and offer testimony of defense witnesses).
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cooperate with police, and information on whether it is neces-
sary to reveal one's innermost thoughts, is far-fetched.
One could instead posit that a liberty interest is infringed
upon by the state when the state attempts to incarcerate a de-
fendant through a criminal trial that utilizes procedures that
violate fundamental fairness. There are two problems with this
procedural due process proposal. The first is that virtually all
practices struck down on this ground, pre-, peri- and post-
selective incorporation, impinged upon the truthseeking func-
tion of the trial. Cases regulating the standard and burdens of
proof in a criminal trial,9 securing the right to present a de-92
fense, prohibiting prejudicial delay in the bringing of
charges, 9 and requiring an impartial judge,4 all ensure the reli-
ability of the verdict and can stake some claim to either history
or consensus. A trial conducted with evidence obtained in vio-
lation of Miranda but not the Fifth Amendment's Self-
" See Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that due process requires
that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for an offense be-
yond the prescribed statutory maximum be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (holding that state
cannot prosecute an individual who has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is incompetent to stand trial); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (striking down
misleadingjury instructions as to reasonable doubt standard); Carella v. California, 491
U.S. 263 (1989) (rejecting conclusive presumptions); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(requiring the state to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
2 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (prohibiting intentional destruction
of or failure to preserve exculpatory evidence); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44
(1987) (holding that defendant has constitutional right to testify at her own trial);
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (state obliged to provide the defense with subpoena access to
possibly favorable agency records); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
(requiring prosecutor to disclose evidence necessary to impeach government
witnesses); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (providing indigent who has shown his
sanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial with access to experts to establish insanity
defense); Chambers, 410 U.S. 284 (right to cross-examine hostile defense witness and
offer testimony of defense witnesses); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory materials to the defense).
'9 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971) (rejecting the defendant's
claim of prejudicial delay in bringing an indictment because it was brought within the
statute of limitations, but nevertheless noting "the real possibility of prejudice inherent
in any extended delay- that memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and
evidence be lost").
" See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (holding that defendant has a
due process right to an unbiased judge); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
(holding that defendant had a due process right to an impartial judge with no
pecuniary interest in obtaining a conviction); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)
(holding that defendant had a due process right to a trial free from mob domination).
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Incrimination Clause is still a trial that is fundamentally fair, and
will generate a reliable verdict.
A second roadblock to a procedural due process right to
Miranda warnings is that the Court has instituted the same
more-specific-provision rule as in the substantive due process
area. First in Dowling v. United States9?" and then in Medina v. Cali-
fornia,95 the Court held that the primary source of regulation of
state criminal trials is the criminal procedural guarantees selec-
tively incorporated into the Due Process Clause. The Court is
reticent to expand procedural due process beyond the specific
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights because:
... [t]he Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many as-
pects of criminal procedure, and .he expansion of those
constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of
the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause invites undue interference with
both considered legislative judgments and the careful bal-
ance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and or-
der.
97
Thus, most of the procedural due process protections discussed
above involve issues unregulated by any more specific clause of
the Bill of Rights. The values underlying the Miranda warnings
are Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination values.
The giving of the warnings does not generally make the trial
more fair, at least in the sense of making the result more accu-
rate or reliable.
Professor Thomas argues that the Warren Court might have
easily used the line of procedural due process cases rather than
the Self-Incrimination Clause in deciding Miranda.0 It seems to
me that an even stronger argument for moving Miranda to the
procedural component of the Due Process Clause even after the
Court's more-specific-provision rule is that the Court continues
to use procedural due process as well as the Self-Incrimination
Clause as the rationale for excluding actually coerced confes-
sions, as opposed to excluding Miranda violations.9 This prac-
- 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) ("Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the
Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.").
505 U.S. 437 (1992).
97 Id. at 443.
SeeThomas, supra note 11, 1097-98.
SeeWithrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993) (acknowledging that eliminating
habeas review of Miranda issues would not serve federalism or efficiency as it would "not
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tice can be explained, however, in two ways. First, the use of
due process is primarily due to the historical accident that par-
ticularly egregious coerced confession cases occurred before the
Self-Incrimination Clause was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied to the states.'o These state police
practices had to be stopped and, prior to Malloy, it was due pro-
cess or bust.'0' Second, using the "due process" rather than
"Self-Incrimination Clause" label allows the Court to easily dis-
tinguish actually compelled confessions from voluntary confes-
sions taken in violation of Miranda.12 Due process has simply
become shorthand for compelled statements, though a self-
incrimination violation, as incorporated against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, is a
more accurate description.
C. MIRANDA AS ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
Finally, Professor Thomas might be suggesting that the
Miranda warnings are protected by the notice and opportunity
to be heard that procedural due process requires before liberty
or property is taken away in an administrative or civil setting.
Professor Thomas focuses on a line of cases requiring notice of
any hearing that might lead to a deprivation of property or lib-
erty, and that use a balancing test to determine what kind of no-
tice and procedures are required by the Due Process Clause.
He cites the seminal due process notice case in civil procedure,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,'0° which required a
prevent a state prisoner from simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a due
process claim that his conviction rested on an involuntary confession."); see also
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) ('The Court has retained this due
process focus, even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies to the States")
(citation omitted).
" See Malloy, 378 U.S. 1 ("Whenever a question arises whether a confession is
incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [the self-incrimination]
portion of the Fifth Amendment.") (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542
(1897)).
'0' Federal police practices were controlled by the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause. See Bratn, 168 U.S. 532.
O2 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993); see also Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda
Dead, was it Ovended, or is it Irrelevant., 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 499-502 (1998)
(noting that once the Miranda issue is addressed, many lower courts neglect to in-
quire into the voluntariness of the resulting confession).
'0' 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (holding that individual beneficiaries have a due process
right to notice of a hearing before the bank closes a trust; representation by a special
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bank to mail notice to known beneficiaries of a trust before that
trust could be closed. Professor Thomas also cites to Morrissey v.
Brewel 4 and Wolff v. McDonnel, ' 5 two other due process cases.
In Morrissey, the Court held that the Iowa Board of Parole had
to hold an administrative hearing prior to revoking the defen-
dant's parole and that the defendant must be given notice of
the hearing and an opportunity to challenge the allegation that
he violated parole by buying a car under an assumed name. In
McDonnell the Court held that the Nebraska Department of
Prisons must give notice and an opportunity to be heard to
prisoner Mr. McDonnell before depriving him of good time
credit and privileges and confining him in a disciplinary cell as
punishment for misconduct. There are a number of insur-
mountable hurdles to applying the rationale of these cases to
the Miranda situation.
The first problem, already covered in my discussion of sub-
stantive due process, is the lack of any liberty interest being
taken without due process. Mr. Mullane had a state-created
property interest in the corpus of the trust,'O Mr. Morrissey had
a state-created liberty interest in the continuation of parole so
long as he abided by its conditions, ' 7 and Mr. McDonnell had a
state-created liberty interest in retaining his good time credits
and privileges absent serious prison misconduct.'Os There is
clearly no state-created liberty interest in receiving Miranda
warnings, "' and, as noted in my substantive due process discus-
sion, the Court has time and again rejected any constitutional
right to notice of criminal procedural guarantees outside the
criminal trial setting."
guardian constitutionally insufficient where the bank knew the names and addresses of
the interested parties) (cited by Thomas, supra note 11, at 1114).
408 U.S. 471 (1972) (cited by Thomas, supra note 11, at 1099 n.85, 1113 n.145).
418 U.S. 539 (1974) (cited byThomas, supra note 11, at 1099 n.85, 1113 n.146).
See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 ("[t]his proceeding does or may deprive beneficiaries
of property").
"7 See Monissey, 408 U.S. at 480 ("Revocation deprives an individual ... of the condi-
tional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.").
10 Wof, 418 U.S. at 558 ("We think a person's liberty is equally protected, even when
the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State.").
" The Miranda requirements were imposed upon the states of Arizona and New
York by the Court quite against their will. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 438 (listing Attorney
Generals of Arizona and NewYork as respondents).
110 See infra notes 50-57.
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Second, the purpose of this procedural due process notice
requirement is to ensure that the person whose property or lib-
erty interest will be infringed attends and is properly prepared
for a hearing, so he has the opportunity to present evidence and
make arguments before his property or liberty interest is extin-
guished. Professor Thomas does not intend to give suspects a
hearing, administrative or otherwise, regarding the deprivation
of their liberty interest in receiving the Miranda warnings.
There are simply no facts to contest were we to hold such a
hearing. In Morrissey and McDonnell, it is appropriate for the
state to deprive those individuals of good time credits and pa-
role rights if, in fact, the individuals violated the parole condi-
tions or prison disciplinary rules. The hearing is necessary to
determine whether the violations occurred. Professor Thomas
provides no standard for when it is acceptable for the state to
deprive someone of their liberty interest in receiving notice of
their Fifth Amendment right and notice that they need not re-
veal their innermost thoughts, or what would be argued at a
hearing regarding such deprivation.
II. SHIFTING MIRANDA TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE WILL NOT
SAVE ITS EXCEPTIONS
Perhaps we could live with a due process theory, despite its
doctrinal shortcomings, if this theory accomplished Professor
Thomas' stated goals of explaining waivers, justifying the over-
protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause, and accounting for
Miranda's exceptions, especially if there were no better alterna-
tive."2 However, my final disagreement with Professor Thomas
regards these claims. In fact, his theory does not adequately ex-
.. See, e.g. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (pre-
deprivation hearing required prior to government seizure of real property); Burns v.
United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) (construing the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3551 (1984), as requiring that a criminal defendant be given notice before a district
court departs upward from the Sentencing Guidelines so that he may contest the fact
upon which the court bases the upward departure, and noting that an interpretation
that did not require notice in such a circumstance would cause serious constitutional
problems); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that a
state employee must be given a hearing before being terminated for cause); Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (requiring clear and convincing evidence before the State
can civilly commit an insane individual); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(finding a full evidentiary hearing after the termination of disability benefits sufficient).
112 SeeThomas, supra note 11, at 1098-1101.
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plain any of what he calls "Mirandds mysteries."'" It is true that
trial rights are less easily waived than Miranda rights. However,
moving Miranda to the Due Process Clause does not provide a
justification for this difference. First of all, it does not explain
why the Self-Incrimination Clause is also easily waived on the
witness stand, even during a grand jury proceeding.14 I doubt
Professor Thomas is willing to say an assertion of the privilege in
those situations is also a due process rather than a Fifth
Amendment right. Moreover, Professor Thomas fails to explain
why the waiver of a due process liberty interest should be waived
"carelessly, inattentively, and without counsel,""5 but a Self-
Incrimination Clause waiver should not be. A better response is
that by agreeing to answer questions, a suspect is waiving his
right, under the prophylactic rule of Miranda, to a presumption
of compulsion. The standard for this waiver should not neces-
sarily be the same standard for waiving a trial right. Rather, it
should reflect whether the purposes underlying the prophylac-
tic rule-to dispel compulsion, guide officer conduct, and ease
Court adjudication-is served by that particular standard."6 We
should not be surprised to find that waiver of a prophylactic
right is easier to accomplish than waiver of a true constitutional
right.
Professor Thomas further claims that his due process test
will retain all of Miranda's exceptions, such as the admission in a
prosecutor's case-in-chief of incriminating statements made in
the absence of Miranda warnings where the questioning was
necessary for public safety,"' the exception allowing statements
taken in violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant should he
take the stand,"8 and the exception allowing derivative evidence
in a prosecutor's case-in-chief that was obtained as the fruits of a
Miranda violation.' 9 George Thomas fairly chides the Court for
never providing a standard as to when Miranda's warnings and
exceptions should come into play and when they should not.z"
... Id at 1083.
"' See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) (privilege considered waived
unless invoked by the grandjury witness).
" Thomas, supra note 11, at 1082.
116 Klein, supra note 12, at 1035-36.
117 SeeNewYork v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
1,8 See Harris v. NewYork, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
' SeeMichigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
' See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1085-86.
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While this criticism is dead-on, Professor Thomas's decision to
view Miranda as providing due process notice rather than Fifth
Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination
does an even worse job at explaining or justifying the excep-
tions. For example, the exception laid out in New York v. Quarles
is clearly a notice violation, as Mr. Quarles received no Miranda
warnings at all. 121 The notice theory also fails to explain Oregon
v. Elstad,122 though Professor Thomas argues otherwise. He
claims Mr. Elstad suffered no deprivation of his liberty interest
in Miranda-style notice because he received the warnings and
then made a statement.lss The problem with this analysis is that
Mr. Elstad first made a statement that was a direct result of a vio-
lation of Miranda. Although he received Miranda warnings at
that point, this notice was something less than timely.124 Had he
received his due process right to notice as Professor Thomas en-
visions, he would have gotten it before the first statement and
probably would never have made the second.'2 Likewise, it is
challenging to justify the admission of the fruits of the Miranda
violation in Michigan v. Tucker, as again the defendant failed to
receive the required notice of his rights. 26 Finally, the applica-
tion of the rule in Edwards v. Arizona, excluding even voluntary
statements made during a second interrogation after the invoca-
tion of a Miranda right during a previous interrogation, fails
under a notice theory because the defendant did receive notice
of his Miranda warnings prior to both sets of custodial interroga-
tions. 27
Next, Professor Thomas claims that even where notice is not
provided, his due process test is flexible enough to retain the
exceptions by its ability to balance a suspect's interest in fairness
and notice against the state's interest in admission of trustwor-
thy evidence. Unfortunately, this kind of balancing is not ap-
121 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652. In Quarks, an officer asked an apprehended rape
suspect about the location of a gun in a public supermarket without Mirandizing him.
'2 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
2 SeeThomas, supra note 11, at 1111.
", See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300-01.
1 He made the second statement assuming the cat was out of the bag, because he
did not understand that the first statement was made in violation of Miranda and was
therefore inadmissible.
121 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 436 (1974) (holding statement given
without full Miranda notice that led to identity of witness was admissible).
"2 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,479 (1981).
'28 SeeThomas, supra note 11, at 1111.
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propriate under any of the due process components. Substan-
tive due process disallows conscience-shocking action that in-
fringes a liberty interest regardless of what procedures are used;
the Court does not engage in balancing.- Likewise, with pro-
cedural due process in the criminal justice setting, the Court in
Medina v. CaliforniaD claimed it was unwilling to use the
Mathews v. Eldridge" procedural due process balancing test.
Rather the Courtjudges the independent content of procedural
due process under the traditional fundamental fairness stan-
dard. 32 If custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings is
fundamentally unfair, it is difficult to see how it is more or less
fundamentally unfair depending upon whether failure to pro-
vide the warnings might help the government by providing de-
rivative evidence or keeping a defendant off the stand.
One could make a plausible argument, however, that the
Mathews v. Eldridge utilitarian balancing test performed by the
Court in civil settings ought to apply in the criminal justice area,
at least outside the confines of the trial itself. Justice O'Connor
recently argued that Mathews v. Eldridge would be particularly
helpful "in the context of modem administrative proceedings"
such as "the new administrative regime established by the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines."'' Though McDonnell and Morrissey
were both decided prior to Mathews v. Eldridge and Medina, the
Court used a Mathews v. E/dridge-like balancing test in both of
those cases. T' Even accepting that a defendant has a liberty in-
terest in receiving the Miranda warnings, and likening the cus-
todial interrogation to some kind of administrative proceeding,
the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test would not save the
Miranda exceptions.
'2 See cases cited supra notes 39-42, 44-45.
'" 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
1.1 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
"2 See Patterson v. NewYork, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
"3 Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter made the
same argument in Burns, 501 U.S. 129, 147-48 (1991) (Soutcr, J., dissenting).
"4 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (holding that "due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands," and balancing the indi-
vidual's interest in liberty against the risk to society that the parolee will commit addi-
tional antisocial acts); McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556 (holding that minimal procedural
requirements under due process are determined by a "mutual accomodation between




First, the right to notice before the deprivation of a liberty
or property interest is a bright line with very little balancing, un-
like the right to certain procedures. Where the identity of the
party is known, due process requires individual notice. Very
occasionally, the Court balances the costs and benefits of provid-
ing notice to those affected, but only where notice is difficult to
provide because the identities of those with an interest are not
readily ascertainable.'s6 In the custodial interrogation setting,
the government always knows the identity of the individual mer-
iting notice, and the monetary and logistical cost of notice to
that individual is nil.
Second, the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test is used to de-
termine what kind of procedures the government must use in a
hearing to adjudicate a liberty or property right, not to deter-
mine whether there will be any adjudication at all. A court bal-
ances three factors: 1) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation,
and the value of additional procedural safeguard; and 3) the
government's interest, including fiscal and administrative bur-
dens, 13' in order to determine whether more or better proce-
dures are indicated. What Professor Thomas is asking is not
what kind of procedures or method of adjudication we ought to
use in deciding whether to violate the individual's liberty inter-
est in receiving his Miranda warnings, but the substantive ques-
tion of whether and under what circumstances we ought to
deprive him of that liberty interest entirely, procedures be
damned. In other words, he is asking whether the government's
interest in crime fighting and truth seeking is sufficiently high
that we ought to deprive the individual of his liberty interest pe-
riod, by either not giving the warnings at all or giving the warn-
ings but then ignoring the individual's invocation of his rights.
"' See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding white firefighters not bound
by consent degree to which they were not parties); see also Tulsa Prof'l Collection
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484-91 (1988) (requiring actual notice to "known
and ascertainable creditors" in probate proceedings); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950).
'm See generally Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral Disputes, 78 IOWA L.
REv. 1011, 1014-21 (1993) (Due Process and F.R.C.P. 23 require individual notice to
identifiable claimants, and adequate representation where individual notice is
impractical).
"7 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
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This is not a due process balancing test, but a Fifth Amendment
balancing test.'m
Viewing Miranda and its exceptions as part of a prophylactic
rule designed to protect Fifth Amendment values, as I recom-
mend, we ought to be asking entirely different questions. First,
does the exclusion of evidence taken in violation of the Miranda
rule further the goals of dissipating the compulsion inherent in
custodial interrogation, easing the Court's task in determining
whether statements were compelled, and providing guidance to
law enforcement officers in obtaining statements? Second, do
the exceptions to this rule compromise its efficacy?' s9 The an-
swers to these questions should come not solely from the Court
but from Congress, state legislators, and social scientists. " O The
process by which our society develops these rules and considers
whether they are functioning properly should not be limited to
the Self-Incrimination Clause, but should be more generally ap-
plicable to all rules designed to safeguard constitutional crimi-
nal procedural guarantees.
Finally, Professor Thomas' last Miranda mystery, the exclu-
sion of voluntary statements, is easily explained by the very defi-
nition of prophylactic rules. When it is impossible to precisely
track the constitutional clause at issue, the Court is forced to ei-
ther over or underprotect. I call the subconstitutional doctrines
'13 I believe that all constitutional clauses are subject, in the most extreme cases, to
a balancing of harms test one cannot yell "fire" in a crowded theater despite the First
Amendment. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); see also Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (law enforcement can search without a warrant where a
life is at stake despite the Fourth Amendment). However, the balancing of the indi-
vidual's right to silence versus law enforcement need for information in the ordinary
case was resolved in favor of the individual by the enactment of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
's' I believe this responds to Professor Thomas' primary criticism of my approach-
that relying on the good faith nature of the Miranda violation to determine exclusion
has nothing to do with the Self-Incrimination Clause, unless one believes that an
intentional violation more likely leads to a coerced confession. Thomas, supra note 11,
at 1118-19. First, it does appear to me true that if an officer refuses to offer Miranda
warnings, or offers them but then ignores their invocation, the suspect might rightly
feel that he privilege will not be honored. More importantly, determining the contours
and areas of application for a prophylactic rule is not dependent upon it reflecting the
values of the constitutional clause it is protecting, but rather upon its efficiency in
protecting that clause. While an intentional or accidentally caused compulsion may
equally violate the Self-Incrimination Clause, it may well be that Miranda's prophylactic
rule will effectively protect the privilege if complied with in good faith, but not
adequately protect the privilege if intentionally flouted.
"' Klein, supra note 12, at 1057-68.
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the Court uses to do this prophylactic rules and safe harbors. 4'
The decision as to which device is more appropriate will depend
entirely upon the purpose of the constitutional clause and the
reason the Court is unable to provide more explicit constitu-
tional interpretation.
III. CONCLUSION
I applaud Professor Thomas' goal of granting the Court
some flexibility both in crafting Miranda warnings and in de-
lineating Miranda exceptions. However, enshrining Miranda in
due process divorces it from the values animating the warnings,
and subjects the Court to the charge of judicial usurpation of
executive and legislative functions, in imposing its own collec-
tive opinion in the guise of a constitutional mandate. Professor
Thomas' placement of Miranda's prophylactic rule into the Due
Process Clause solves the legitimacy question only for that single
decision. Unless Professor Thomas is willing to move every
other prophylactic rule into the Due Process Clause as well, or
to eliminate them entirely, he doesn't fully resolve Miranda's
mysteries. My more complete and conceptually pleasing pro-
posal not only resolves what Professor Thomas calls the three
Miranda mysteries, but also accounts for many similar doctrinal
devices, and their mysteries, throughout constitutional criminal
procedure. It does this by sharing power with the other
branches of the federal and state governments, rather than
usurping their authority. Finally, it will stimulate social science
empirical research into the facts on the ground and alternative
improved procedures.
' Klein, supra note 12, at 1032-33.
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